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Abstract
On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in
Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and
premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worst
industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility.
Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country's
Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively
small amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences of
exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceable
international standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents
and industrial disaster preparedness.
Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in
government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the
environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmental
degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughout
India.
December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the
massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's
chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh,
India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review
examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, the
legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not
these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial
development, environmental management and public
health.
History
In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies to
encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry.
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a
plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly
used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's govern-
ment insisted that a significant percentage of the invest-
ment come from local shareholders. The government
itself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, Union
Carbide India Limited (UCIL) [1]. The company built the
plant in Bhopal because of its central location and access
to transport infrastructure. The specific site within the city
was zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not for
hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only
for formulation of pesticides from component chemicals,
such as MIC imported from the parent company, in rela-
tively small quantities. However, pressure from competi-
tion in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement
"backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materi-
als and intermediate products for formulation of the final
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sophisticated and hazardous process [2].
In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter
of its production capacity due to decreased demand for
pesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on the
subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtedness
and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides.
Local managers were directed to close the plant and pre-
pare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability
[3]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to
dismantle key production units of the facility for ship-
ment to another developing country. In the meantime,
the facility continued to operate with safety equipment
and procedures far below the standards found in its sister
plant in Institute, West Virginia. The local government
was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place
heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on
the struggling industry because it feared the economic
effects of the loss of such a large employer [3].
At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one
million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant
noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and
increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas
scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic dis-
charge from the MIC system, had been turned off three
weeks prior [3]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one
ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with forty
tons of MIC [1]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally
served as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tank
had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of
the plant [3]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exother-
mic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flare
safety system was out of action and had been for three
months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling
reverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave way
sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [4].
Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with
human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs
and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately,
mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant
[1,5]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the
injured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowl-
edge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effects
were [1]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters in
history and the name Bhopal became synonymous with
industrial catastrophe [5].
Estimates of the number of people killed in the first few
days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as
10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths report-
edly occurring in the subsequent two decades [6]. The
Indian government reported that more than half a million
people were exposed to the gas [7]. Several epidemiologi-
cal studies conducted soon after the accident showed sig-
nificant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed
population. Table 1. summarizes early and late effects on
health. These data are likely to under-represent the true
extent of adverse health effects because many exposed
individuals left Bhopal immediately following the disas-
ter never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up
[8].
Table 1: Health effects of the Bhopal methyl isocyanate gas leak exposure [8, 30-32].
Early effects (0–6 months)
Ocular Chemosis, redness, watering, ulcers, photophobia
Respiratory Distress, pulmonary edema, pneumonitis, pneumothorax.
Gastrointestinal Persistent diarrhea, anorexia, persistent abdominal pain.
Genetic Increased chromosomal abnormalities.
Psychological Neuroses, anxiety states, adjustment reactions
Neurobehavioral Impaired audio and visual memory, impaired vigilance attention and 
response time, Impaired reasoning and spatial ability, impaired 
psychomotor coordination.
Late effects (6 months onwards)
Ocular Persistent watering, corneal opacities, chronic conjunctivitis
Respiratory Obstructive and restrictive airway disease, decreased lung function.
Reproductive Increased pregnancy loss, increased infant mortality, decreased 
placental/fetal weight
Genetic Increased chromosomal abnormalities
Neurobehavioral Impaired associate learning, motor speed, precisionPage 2 of 6
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Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to
dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its
principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the
plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsid-
iary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by pre-
viously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled
employees but this theory was impugned by numerous
independent sources [1].
The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7,
the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an Amer-
ican attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of
years of legal machinations in which the ethical implica-
tions of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were
largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government
enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of
ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be
dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the gov-
ernment the sole representative of the victims in legal pro-
ceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all
cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the rul-
ing of the presiding American judge and placed entirely
under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the
injured parties.
In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court,
UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay
$470 million to the Indian government to be distributed
to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was
partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people
died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [9].
Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2
per share or 7% in value [1]. Had compensation in Bhopal
been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where
being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC
– which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability
would have been greater than the $10 billion the com-
pany was worth and insured for in 1984 [10]. By the end
of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy
Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had
been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and
15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to
families of the dead was $2,200 [9].
At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfus-
cate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of vic-
tims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly
what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that
December night [8]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat,
it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly
hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that
the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the dis-
aster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some
victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning
[11]. Moreover, many responded well to administration
of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide
poisoning but not MIC exposure [11]. UCC initially rec-
ommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the
statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to
cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of
HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of
conjecture among researchers [8,11-13].
As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bho-
pal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the
industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak sev-
eral toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found
their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated
water has now been added to the legacy left by the com-
pany for the people of Bhopal [1,14].
Lessons learned
The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industriali-
zation in developing countries without concurrent evolu-
tion in safety regulations could have catastrophic
consequences [4]. The disaster demonstrated that seem-
ingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic con-
tamination are often tied to global market dynamics.
UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya
Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the
U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide
market. However the manner in which the project was
executed suggests the existence of a double standard for
multinational corporations operating in developing
countries [1]. Enforceable uniform international operat-
ing regulations for hazardous industries would have pro-
vided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in
Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international stand-
ards could provide norms for measuring performance of
individual companies engaged in hazardous activities
such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic
chemicals in India [15]. National governments and inter-
national agencies should focus on widely applicable tech-
niques for corporate responsibility and accident
prevention as much in the developing world context as in
advanced industrial nations [16]. Specifically, prevention
should include risk reduction in plant location and design
and safety legislation [17].
Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facili-
ties to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the
evolution of land use over time. Industry and government
need to bring proper financial support to local communi-
ties so they can provide medical and other necessary serv-
ices to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in
the case of industrial accidents.
Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in
1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a dayPage 3 of 6
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system, untreated human waste was dumped into two
nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had
four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physi-
cians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualty
emergency response system in place in the city [3]. Exist-
ing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into
account when hazardous industries choose sites for man-
ufacturing plants. Future management of industrial devel-
opment requires that appropriate resources be devoted to
advance planning before any disaster occurs [18]. Com-
munities that do not possess infrastructure and technical
expertise to respond adequately to such industrial acci-
dents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous
industry.
Since 1984
Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental
awareness and activism in India increased significantly.
The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, cre-
ating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF)
and strengthening India's commitment to the environ-
ment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overall
responsibility for administering and enforcing environ-
mental laws and policies. It established the importance of
integrating environmental strategies into all industrial
development plans for the country. However, despite
greater government commitment to protect public health,
forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the
country's economy have taken precedence in the last 20
years [19].
India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the
two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in
1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rate
of over 8% per year [20]. Rapid industrial development
has contributed greatly to economic growth but there has
been significant cost in environmental degradation and
increased public health risks. Since abatement efforts con-
sume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill
battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial
pollution [19]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants
and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have
result from economic concerns taking precedence over
environmental protection [19].
With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an
increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered
about major urban areas in India. There are generally less
stringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIs
due to less waste generation within each individual indus-
try. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewa-
ter into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers.
New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously
high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium,
chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river
which is a major supply of potable water to India's capital
thus posing a potential health risk to the people living
there and areas downstream [21].
Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial
solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout
India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of
industrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appre-
ciably and the environmental impact is significant [22].
India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order
to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing
flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental
regulations are being rolled back as growing foreign
investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is
comparable to that of a number of developing countries
that are experiencing the environmental impacts of struc-
tural adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural
resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibi-
tions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically
sensitive zones have been eliminated while conservation
zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide,
cement and bauxite mines can be built [23]. Heavy reli-
ance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of
vehicle emission laws are other consequences of eco-
nomic concerns taking precedence over environmental
protection [19].
In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India
caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed
when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced
waste from a thermometer factory run by the company's
Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile
of mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling
onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a
school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the
World Trade Center was exported to India apparently
without first being tested for contamination from asbestos
and heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Other
examples of poor environmental stewardship and eco-
nomic considerations taking precedence over public
health concerns abound [24].
The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the
chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the
necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in
the first place. However the lessons of acute and chronic
effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in
Bhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An
estimated 3 million people per year suffer the conse-
quences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occur-
ring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to
be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year.Page 4 of 6
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have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a
toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the
events of Bhopal [25].
Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing
countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use
in developed nations due to the well-established link
between asbestos products and respiratory diseases. India
has become a major consumer, using around 100,000
tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with
Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, pro-
duction and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regu-
lated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown
morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will
continue in India without enforcement of a ban or signif-
icantly tighter controls [26,27].
UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal
disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By
doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed
a significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach of
the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives
bountiful profits [1]. The company still operates under the
ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its web-
site that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sab-
otage". [28].
Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal
disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian
subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to
health, safety and environmental issues following the
events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–
40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-
related projects. However, they still do not adhere to
standards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [24].
The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bho-
pal in a different way. The company attempted for a dec-
ade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa,
India. In its early negotiations with the Indian govern-
ment, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in
its investment agreement that absolved it from all liabili-
ties in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not
willing to acquiesce while an important ecological site
was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a
decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was
forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next pro-
posed site for the plastics plant. The state government
there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for
concessions on public health and environmental protec-
tion. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due to
what the company called "financial concerns". [29].
Conclusion
The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at
once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were
a warning that the path to industrialization, for develop-
ing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught
with human, environmental and economic perils. Some
moves by the Indian government, including the forma-
tion of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of
the public's health from the harmful practices of local and
multinational heavy industry and grassroots organiza-
tions that have also played a part in opposing rampant
development. The Indian economy is growing at a tre-
mendous rate but at significant cost in environmental
health and public safety as large and small companies
throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far
more remains to be done for public health in the context
of industrialization to show that the lessons of the count-
less thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.
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